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I.

INTRODUCTION

On July 21, 2010, in response to the global financial crisis that began in
2008, President Barack Obama signed into law The Dodd-Frank Wall Street
Reform and Consumer Protection Act1 (Dodd-Frank), which effected a
“sweeping overhaul of the financial regulatory system, a transformation on a scale
not seen since the reforms that followed the Great Depression.”2
Section 922,3 Dodd-Frank’s far-reaching whistleblower provision, and the
subsequent final whistleblower rules promulgated by the Securities and Exchange
Commission (“SEC”), garnered substantial business media attention4 stemming
from one dramatic contention: internal reporting of misconduct is not a
prerequisite to external reporting, and the failure to do so does not preclude
eligibility for a bounty award.5
With the expanded federal whistleblower provisions under Dodd-Frank—
particularly the design for astronomical bounties and the circumvention of
internal reporting mechanisms—members of the corporate community have
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§ 922, 124 Stat. at 1841-42.
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mounted significant opposition and distaste.6
The reality of the new
whistleblower scheme has driven organizations to revisit their internal reporting
systems in a desperate attempt to preempt external reporting to the SEC, despite
the impossibility of this task.7
With employees being encouraged to report directly to the SEC, the
Dodd-Frank era also prompts organizations to question the effectiveness of their
corporate culture as well as their ability to persevere in an environment in which
they are heavily undermined.8 In particular, as internal reporting mechanisms
within the corporation continue to be circumvented, corporations are bound to
realize a significant decline in the overall levels of trust and commitment to
internal compliance, both essential components of a thriving, positive corporate
culture.9 Until stronger measures are taken to fully support the internal workings
of an organization, our nation will not experience the utmost prevention and
detection of securities law violations.
This Comment maintains that Dodd-Frank’s failure to meaningfully
support internal reporting has an injurious effect on corporate cultures of trust
and compliance. Part II presents details regarding the whistleblower provisions
of Dodd-Frank. Part III discusses and defines corporate culture and offers
particular emphasis on the importance of trust and compliance as components of
organizational culture. Part IV assesses the specific erosions of corporate cultures
of trust and compliance resulting from Dodd-Frank. Part V proposes a
procedural mechanism in the form of an affirmative defense to reward firms for
establishing an effective corporate culture of trust and compliance. Part VI offers
concluding remarks.

See Luis Calvo, Dodd-Frank Wets Whistles, FORDHAM CORP. LAW FORUM, February 14, 2012,
http://fordhamcorporatecenter.org/2012/02/14/dodd-frank-wets-whistles/.
6

See Michael D. Greenberg, For Whom the Whistle Blows: Advancing Corporate Compliance and
Integrity Efforts in the Era of Dodd Frank 13 RAND CORP. (2011), available at
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/conf_proceedings/2011/RAND_CF290.pdf
[hereinafter Symposium].
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DODD-FRANK FINANCIAL REFORM AND CONSUMER PROTECTION
ACT
A.

The Whistleblower Scheme

Among the new rules and regulations of Dodd-Frank is § 922,10 which
entices whistleblowers to come forward to externally report securities law
violations.11 How is this accomplished? Section 922 obliges the SEC to award
significant bounties to individuals who offer particular information to the SEC
regarding securities violations,12 and it provides superior anti-retaliation
protections in the employment context for individuals who provide the SEC with
such information13—notably, these anti-retaliation protections are only afforded
to employees who report the information externally.14
Enacted to promote the effective and efficient detection of securities law
violations, § 922 of Dodd-Frank amends the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
(the “Exchange Act”) by adding § 21F, entitled “Securities Whistleblower
Incentives and Protection.”15 Pursuant to § 21F, the SEC took a largely prowhistleblower approach to defining terms, detailing the scope of eligibility, and
clarifying procedures for obtaining awards.16 The SEC is required to pay an
award between ten and thirty percent of sanctions imposed to whistleblowers
who (1) voluntarily provide the SEC, (2) with original information, (3) that leads
to successful enforcement by the SEC, (4) and results in monetary sanctions of
more than $1 million.17
While Dodd-Frank defines original information, the SEC’s final rules
further limit what will be considered “original” information.18 According to the
rules, the information must be: (1) based on the whistleblower’s own knowledge
10

§ 922, 124 Stat. at 1841-42.

11

§ 922(b) & (c), 124 Stat. at 1842-43.

12

Id.

13

See § 922(h) & (c), 124 Stat. at 1845-46.

14

Id.

15

§ 922, 124 Stat. at 1841.

For further analysis, see Heather Jones, The Dodd-Frank Whistleblower Program: An Analysis of
Proposed and Final Rules, 2 AM. U. LABOR & EMP. L.F. 131 (2011).

16
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17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-3 (2010); § 922(b), 124 Stat. at 1842.

18

17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-4(b) (2010).
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or analysis, (2) not already known to the Commission from a separate source, and
(3) not exclusively derived from an allegation made in a prior hearing, report,
investigation, or news story.19
A whistleblower provides original information that leads to a “successful
enforcement” action when the SEC brings a successful judicial or administrative
action based on the information provided in one of several circumstances:20 (1)
the information provided to the SEC was sufficiently specific, credible, and timely
to prompt the SEC to launch an examination, open an investigation, or reopen a
prior investigation;21 (2) the information pertained to conduct that was already
under examination or investigation by the SEC, and the tip significantly
contributed to the success of the action;22 and (3) the whistleblower internally
reported the information before or at the same time as he or she reported that
information to the SEC and the entity later self-reports the information.23
Ultimately, if all criteria are met, the determination of the amount of an
award is in the discretion of the SEC;24 however, the amount of the award is
certain to be between ten percent and thirty percent of the amount of sanctions
collected by the SEC or other authorities.25
B.

Internal Reporting Under Dodd-Frank

Although many people—particularly members of the business
community—urged the SEC to require whistleblowers to first report information
through internal reporting procedures, the final rules adopted by the SEC do not
require employees to report information internally before reporting directly to the
SEC.26 In fact, those rules expressly reject the notion of mandatory internal
reporting.27 Instead, the SEC tried to ameliorate corporate concerns by allegedly

19

See id.

20

17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-4(c) (2010).

21

17§ 240.21F-4(c)(1).

22

§ 240.21F-4(c)(2).

23

§ 240.21F-4(c)(3).

2417
25

C.F.R. § 240.21F-5(a) (2010).

17 § 240.21F-5(b).

See Press Release, SEC Adopts Rules to Establish Whistleblower Program (May 25, 2011),
available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2011/2011-116.htm [hereinafter SEC Adopts Rules].
26

27

See id.
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promoting internal reporting through alternative incentives intended to encourage
employees to make use of their own company’s internal compliance programs.28
Among these supposed incentives, the final rules deem a whistleblower
eligible for a bounty if the whistleblower first reports internally and the company
later self-reports to the SEC regarding the same violations.29 However, these
incentives have little practical effect as the rules provide significant monetary
incentives for employees to withhold information from a company— withholding
information permits monetary sanctions to grow.30
Additionally, if an employee first reports internally, and subsequently
provides the same “original information” to the SEC within a 120-day grace
period, the final rules treat an employee as providing “original information” if the
information is not already known to the SEC as of the date the employee
reported internally.31 Thus, employees are able to maintain their “place in line”
for a potential bounty even after first reporting the information internally.32
The SEC also has authority to use its discretion in setting bounty amounts
to encourage whistleblowers to use internal compliance procedures before
reporting directly to the SEC.33 As such, a whistleblower’s voluntary use of an
entity’s internal reporting system is a factor that can increase the amount of the
bounty.34 Conversely, a whistleblower’s obstruction of an internal reporting
system is a factor that can decrease the amount of the bounty.35 In reality, this
incentive is a “mere half measure” that does little to encourage internal reporting;
28

Id.

29

Id.

Letter from David Hirschmann to Elizabeth Murphy, Secretary of U.S. Securities Exchange
Commission (Feb. 15, 2011), at 2-3, available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-33-10/s73310145.pdf.

30

See Steven J. Pearlman, New Whistleblower Policies and Incentives: A Paradigm Shift from “Oversight” to
“Insight”, at 38, in Symposium, For Whom the Whistle Blows: Advancing Corporate Compliance
and Integrity Efforts in the Era of Dodd Frank, May 11, 2011, available at
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/conf_proceedings/2011/RAND_CF290.pdf
[hereinafter Whistle Blows].

31

32 See

id.

33

See SEC Adopts Rules, supra note 26.

34

See id.

35

Id.

74

TRANSACTIONS: THE TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW

[Vol. 15

the possibility of a subjective increase in the reward for internal reporting is not
enough to combat the large risk of company remediation efforts and the resulting
decrease or elimination of the bounty.36 The SEC’s refusal to make access to
whistleblower bounties contingent on first reporting instances of misconduct
internally invited significant controversy in the corporate community about the
damaging effects on corporate culture, discussed in the following sections of this
paper.37
III.

CORPORATE CULTURE

The Dodd-Frank whistleblower scheme and its potential for enormous
bounties gives rise to a number of detrimental consequences, including an
evisceration of corporate culture.38 To provide a platform on which this
consequence can be analyzed, this section discusses the definition of corporate
culture as well as the importance of developing a corporate culture of trust and
compliance.
A. Corporate Culture Defined
Historically, the anthropological field lacks consensus as to the meaning
of culture, and naturally, its application in the corporate context also varies to a
large extent.39 Because corporate culture is heavily influenced by industry,
geographic location, and a plethora of other factors, the term has been defined in
countless ways.40 However, in a formal sense, the term corporate culture has
generated a few distinct meanings, including: the shared beliefs, values,
experiences, attitudes, and processes that contribute to the unique environment of
an organization and are widely shared and strongly held throughout the
organization; the glue that holds organizations together by providing cohesiveness
and coherence among the parts; and “the pattern of arrangement, material or
behavior which has been adopted by a [corporation] … as the accepted way of

James J. DiGiulio, The Dodd-Frank Whistleblower Program: A Blown Opportunity 17 (2011),
http://www.mdmc-law.com/index.cfm/about/articles-updates/.
36

37

See Whistle Blows, supra note 31, at 34.

38

Id.

See Jeffrey Kerr & John W. Slocum, Jr., Managing Corporate Culture through Reward Systems, 19
ACAD. OF MGMT. EXECUTIVE 130, 130 (2005); Linda Smircich, Concepts of Culture and Organizational
Analysis, 28 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 339, 339 (1983).
39

Golnaz Sadri & Brian Lees, Developing Corporate Culture as a Competitive Advantage, 20 J. OF MGMT.
DEV. 853, 854 (2001).
40
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solving problems.41 More informally, and perhaps in more useful jargon,
corporate culture has been readily described as “how we do things around here.”42
Conversely, corporate culture is not a multitude of controls, nor is it a list of rules
and regulations.43
Despite its intangible nature, corporate culture manifests in virtually every
aspect of corporate behavior.44 The collection of past and current philosophies
that comprises corporate culture pervades the corporation’s appearance and
reputation, business strategies, internal policies and procedures, community and
customer relations, and expectations for growth and development.45 Corporate
culture also permeates the way in which a corporation treats its employees, the
strength of employee dedication towards corporate goals and objectives, and the
values and beliefs of a corporate culture, which “foster[s] norms that influence
employees’ behavior.”46 Corporate culture even impacts the way in which the
corporate office looks, the names of the conference rooms, corporate slogans,
and how employees dress.47
Moreover, corporate culture generally promotes several distinguishable
beliefs and values.48 Numerous Fortune 500 companies have successfully
developed and maintained strong corporate cultures that advance values such as
excellent customer service,49 open and honest communication,50 diversity,51
philanthropy and community participation,52 and informality and fun.53

See
id.;
Organizational
Culture
Definition,
BUSINESSDICTIONARY.COM,
http://www.businessdictionary.com/definition/organizational-culture.html (last visited March 13,
2012) [hereinafter Organizational Culture].

41

42

Shili Sun, Organizational Culture and Its Themes, 3 INT. J. OF BUS. & MGMT. 137, 137 (2008).

See Margaret M. Towle, “Culture of Compliance” from an Organizational Theory Perspective, 20 THE
MONITOR,
Nov./
Dec.
2005,
at
3,
available
at
http://professional.financialcounsel.com/News/Economics/IMCA/2005/IMCA_11-1205.pdf.

43
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See Organizational Culture, supra note 41.

45

See id.

46

See id.; Kerr & Slocum, supra note 39, at 130.

47

See generally Organizational Culture, supra note 41.

48

See Towle, supra note 43, at 5.

See Robert Reiss, Driving a Global Corporate Culture of 1.4 Million Employees, FORBES (March 5,
2012), http://www.forbes.com/sites/robertreiss/2012/03/05/driving-a-global-corporate-cultureof-1-4-million-employees/.
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Regardless of the values and beliefs the firm chooses to promote, a
successful corporate strategy must embody a strong corporate culture of trust and
compliance. In turn, these are discussed next.
B.

Trust as a Component of Corporate Culture

Creating, building, and sustaining trust are essential components of
fostering a positive corporate culture within an organization.54 An organization is
unable to foster a corporate culture of compliance55 without first nurturing a
corporate culture of employees being able to trust the corporation.56 However,
while trust—like culture—is difficult to define, experts commonly describe trust
as “a state of mind that enables its possessor to be willing to make herself
vulnerable to another . . . .”57 Organizations whose members trust each other
often experience superior performance, while organizations whose members do
not trust each other are more prone to competitive failures.58 Moreover,
organizations that promote trust relationships among corporate participants can
significantly reduce, if not eliminate, the costs associated with controlling
opportunistic behavior.59

E.g., Corporate Vision, Philosophy and Financial Objectives, MACY’S, INC. (Apr. 17, 2012),
http://www.macysinc.com/AboutUs/Vision/default.aspx .
50

E.g.,
Our
People,
GENERAL
http://www.ge.com/company/culture/people.html.
51

ELECTRIC

(Apr.

17,

2012),

See e.g., Cultivating a Corporate Culture of Giving, LOS ALTOS TOWN CRIER (Feb. 15, 2012), available
at
http://www.losaltosonline.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=42323&Itemid
=198.
52

53

See Sadri & Lees, supra note 40, at 857.

See Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, Trust, Trustworthiness, and the Behavioral Foundations of
Corporate
54

Law, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1735, 1758 (2001).
55

See infra Part III.D.

See Elleta Sangrey Callahan et. al., Integrating Trends in Whistleblowing and Corporate Governance:
Promoting Organizational Effectiveness, Societal Responsibility, and Employee Empowerment, 40 AM. BUS. L.J.
177, 191 (2002).
56

Claire A. Hill & Erin Ann O’Hara, A Cognitive Theory of Trust, 84 WASH. U. L. REV. 1717, 1724
(2006).
57

58

See id. at 1753.

59

See id. at 1757.
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There are many facets to developing a culture of trust within an
organization.60 First and foremost, the adoption of formal policies and
procedures, such as a code of ethics—accompanied with a strong commitment to
upholding these policies and procedures—promotes trust by defining core values
and the role of employees in carrying them out.61 Moreover, clear policies permit
corporate participants to become familiar with group norms, achieve cohesion,
and bring together individual interests with group welfare.62
Secondly,
organizations must promote clear communication channels, establish open door
policies, and encourage the challenging of norms in all realms of corporate
decision-making.63 A general encouragement of questioning, without fear of
retaliation—especially with regard to legal compliance—should pervade the
corporate culture.64 Unrestricted communication not only promotes trust but
also helps to reassure employees that reporting internally is encouraged and
valued.65 Lastly, organizations must live and breathe a commitment to an
environment where members treat each other well and where teamwork and unity
are used as a means to achieving company goals.66 Where collaboration and
teamwork are encouraged, not only are employees more likely to act ethically, but
they are also more likely to develop trust in internal reporting mechanisms.67

60

See Callahan, supra note 56, at 199-201.

61

See id. at 201-03.

62

Id. at 207-08.

See Carl Oliver & Francis Daly, Encouraging Internal Whistleblowing (And More!),
http://www.scu.edu/ethics/practicing/focusareas/business/whistleblowing-update.html
(last
visited Mar. 19, 2012).

63

Carl R. Oliver & Francis J. Daly, Encouraging Internal Whistleblowing (And More!), SANTA CLARA
UNIV., June 2007, http://www.scu.edu/ethics/practicing/focusareas/business/whistleblowingupdate.html.

64

65

See Callahan, supra note 56, at 208.

66

See id.

See generally Tom Taulli, Why Corporate America’s New Asset is Ethics, and Enforcement of the SarbanesOxley
Ought
to
Help
the
Stock
Market,
FINDLAW
(Jan.
14,
2003),
http://writ.news.findlaw.com/commentary/20030114_taulli.html.
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Legal Compliance as a Component of Corporate Culture

Corporate compliance “has traditionally been understood as conformity
or obedience to regulations and legislation.”68 However, with the recent global
financial crisis, and the resulting shareholder, stakeholder, and community
scrutiny, contemporary understandings of corporate compliance is becoming
much more expansive in scope.69 As such, corporate compliance is no longer
viewed merely as a legal obligation that must be fulfilled, but also has developed
into an integral component of corporate culture.70 Specifically, a culture of
compliance is a phrase habitually used to refer to a culture that promotes
compliance with applicable laws, regulations, and policies among employees at all
levels of the corporation.71 Compliance executives point toward culture as a
critical priority for building successful compliance initiatives.72 Additionally,
behavioral science indicates that a corporate culture of compliance is “the single
most effective, measurable driver of compliant behavior [that]…works ‘when no
one is looking.’”73
Ultimately, it is not enough to have policies and procedures in place. To
be successful, compliance must be embedded into the entity’s corporate culture.74
It is well established that to cultivate a corporate culture of compliance
corporations must first and foremost comply with the standards set forth in the

Lisa Interligi, Compliance Culture: A Conceptual Framework, 16 J. OF MGMT. & ORG. 235, 235-36
(2004).
68

69

See id. at 235.

70

See id. at 236.

71

Id.

Corporate Culture is the Top Priority for Ethics & Compliance Leaders in 2011, LRN Study Says,
CORPORATE
COMPLIANCE
INSIGHTS
(May
3,
2011),
http://www.corporatecomplianceinsights.com/news/corporate-culture-is-the-top-priority-forethics-compliance-leaders-in-2011-lrn-study-says/.
72

News announcement from Bryan Cave, Command, Control, Culture and Compliance:
Behavioral Science Findings on Corporate Culture, Employee Compliance and Reporting (June
14, 2012), http://www.bryancave.com/newsevents/events/detail.aspx?event=1145.
73

Lori A. Richards, Director, Office of Compliance Inspections and Examinations of the
Securities and Exchange Commission, Speech by SEC Staff: The Culture of Compliance (Apr. 23,
2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch042303lar.htm [hereinafter Richards
Speech].
74
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Federal Sentencing Guidelines75 (the “Sentencing Guidelines”) and SarbanesOxley of 2002 (“Sarbanes-Oxley”).76 From there, a corporation must advance a
culture that equates corporate success with acting in a compliant manner.77 That
is, it must have a strategic vision that incorporates compliance.78 According to
the SEC, a culture of compliance should also identify specific risks that could
arise within this strategic vision and establish control points for each of these
risks.79 Additionally, although a culture of compliance cannot be built overnight,
it can be developed over time with a permeating “value from top to bottom that
encourages compliance with the law.”80 Thus, there must be a visible dedication
and support by senior management.81 Correspondingly, there must be specific
people from top to bottom that are accountable for building the corporate culture
of compliance.82 Finally, a corporation fosters a culture of compliance not only
through the promotion of legal compliance behavior but also through exuding
fundamental values such as trust, which is strongly linked to employee
performance and corporate commitment.83
D.

The Importance of a Corporate Culture of Trust and Compliance

Legally, building a culture of trust and compliance has many benefits,
including the lessening of potential civil and criminal liability under the
Sentencing Guidelines and Sarbanes-Oxley.84 “Public policy [, as exemplified
See generally U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8 (2012), available at
http://www.ussc.gov/Guidelines/2012_Guidelines/Manual_PDF/Chapter_8.pdf (describing the
sentencing of organizational defendants).

75

See generally Public Company Accounting Reform and Investor Protection Act of 2002, Pub. L.
No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2003).

76

See Australian Competition & Consumer Commission, Trade Practices Compliance Programs,
http://www.accc.gov.au/media-release/guide-to-corporate-trade-practices-compliance-programs
(last visited Sept. 22, 2013).

77

78

See Richards Speech, supra note 74.

79

Id.

Trade Practices and Fair Trading: Developing a Compliance Program for Trade Practices, DIYCOMPLY,
http://www.diycomply.net/ssl/Subscription1.2/index-3_TPA_CreateCulture.aspx.

80

Stephany Watson, Fostering Positive Corporate Culture in the Post-Enron Era, 6 TRANSACTIONS:
TENN. J. BUS. L. 7, 38 (2004).

81

82

See id.

83

See supra Part III.B; Interligi, supra note 68, at 235.

84

See Watson, supra note 81, at 31-32.
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through these federal laws,] has long supported internal compliance and reporting
systems.85 In enacting these policies, the federal government recognized that a
culture of trust and compliance encourages employees to report questionable
conduct and “cultivates a system by which companies can stop wrongdoing
promptly and take appropriate remedial action expeditiously.”86 At the same
time, this allows companies to enhance their internal policies and procedures in
an effort to curb future wrongful behavior.87
Aside from the legal motivations for developing a culture of trust and
compliance, corporations have ample business incentives—both financial and
non-financial—to foster a resilient and positive corporate culture of trust and
compliance.88 An organization that prioritizes a culture of trust and compliance
not only tends to be more enjoyable to work for, but also is likely to experience
“increased levels of teamwork, sharing of information, and openness to new
ideas.”89 Increased interaction among employees spurs open and honest
communication and a continuous flow of information throughout the
corporation.90 Moreover, this environment of teamwork and information sharing
contributes to an employee perception of trustworthiness, and consequently,
enhanced employee morale.91
Furthermore, corporate culture that supports trust and compliance is a
critical element of successful enterprise risk management for employees and
shareholders.92 Ample evidence suggests that—in corporations supporting a
culture of trust and compliance—employees who have a substantial interest in
their compensation are more likely to be innovative and cost-conscious, and thus,

Letter from Donna Dabney to Elizabeth Murphy, Secretary of U.S. Securities Exchange
Commission (Dec. 17. 2010), at 9, available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-3310/s73310.shtml [hereinafter Dabney Letter].
85

86

Id.

87

See id.

88

See generally id. at 8-9.

89

Sadri & Lees, supra note 40, at 856 (citation omitted).

90

See id.

91

See generally Watson, supra note 81, at 31-32.

Carlo V. di Florio, Office of Compliance Inspections and Examinations of the Securities and
Exchange Commission, Speech by SEC Staff: The Role of Compliance and Ethics in Risk
Management
(Oct.
17,
2011),
available
at
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2011/spch101711cvd.htm.
92
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compliant organizations tend to be more profitable.93 Many corporate leaders
find that a strong ethical culture benefits the bottom line, with studies showing a
direct relationship between ethics and compliance practices and the strength of
numerous business success indicators, such as stock price.94 A culture of trust
and compliance has also been linked with enhanced financial and sales
performance, greater access to capital, strengthened brand image, positive
community relations, improved shareholder relations, improved relations with
regulatory authorities, and overcoming pressure from activist groups.95
III.

DODD-FRANK UNDERMINES CORPORATE CULTURE
A.

Erosions of Trust

Traditional analysis has asserted that external legal and market incentives
are the driving force of “discouraging opportunistic behavior” and encouraging
organizational trust and cooperation.96 Recently, however, social science has
demonstrated that external financial incentives are indeed less of a motivating
source for governing organizational behavior than the phenomenon of internal
trust.97 Although distinguishable from the realities of the business world, social
science has effectively compiled data from social dilemma games to reveal
behavioral patterns in the organizational realm.98 These games demonstrate that
trust is not always most effectively promoted by promising external rewards, and
in reality, external incentives can reduce levels of trust within an organization by
diminishing internal motivations.99 As such, Dodd-Frank’s advancement of
external rewards and incentives for whistleblowers that report securities violations
directly to the SEC without reporting first to the organization reduces the overall
level of trust within organizations.

93

See Watson, supra note 81, at 32.

See The Impact of Codes of Conduct on Corporate Culture: Measuring the Immeasurable, LRN 3 (2006),
available at

94

www.ethics.org/files/u5/LRNImpactofCodesofConduct.pdf.
95

See Watson, supra note 81, at 33.

96

See id. at 35.

97

Blair & Stout, supra note 54, at 1735.

98

See id. at 1777.

99

Id. at 1139.
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To begin, the Dodd-Frank whistleblower provisions erode trust by
removing the power of organizations to require the use of their internal reporting
mechanisms for exposing misconduct. Specifically, social dilemma literature
demonstrates that formal instructions are powerful tools in determining the
likelihood of cooperation and the existence of trust,100 especially when the formal
instructions originate from someone who is perceived as an authoritative figure.101
As a result of Dodd-Frank, authoritative figures within organizations are unable
to give truly binding formal instructions—through codes of conduct, for
example—to report misconduct within the organization in the first instance.
Conversely, if the SEC were to explicitly support internal reporting mechanisms
and corporate cultures of trust and compliance, organizations would have the
backing to promote cooperation through formal instructions from internal figures
of authority. As the law currently stands, however, the SEC virtually removes the
authoritative power from the corporation to promulgate effective and binding
formal instructions for internal reporting. As a result, a lack of cooperation with
internal procedures, a lack of trust within the system, and an undermining of
corporate culture is bound to follow.
Furthermore, the Dodd-Frank whistleblower provisions erode group
identity and communication—both essential components of trust within an
organization. The social dilemma experiments suggest that permitting players to
communicate with each other significantly increases the incidence of cooperation
and feelings of group identity; conversely, the incidence of cooperation and
feelings of group identity are dramatically decreased when players are unable to
communicate effectively.102 In turn, Dodd-Frank’s failure to promote and
support internal communications by allowing whistleblowers to bypass the
internal reporting systems leads to reduced communication within the
organization regarding concerns about potential misconduct. Moreover, because
of the lack of communication and sharing of information stemming from the
desire to be the first to report original information, a “silo mentality”—an attitude
found in organizations in which groups do not want to share information or
knowledge—ensues.103 Social science as well as contemporary corporate
In one social dilemma study, two-thirds of the group that was told they were going to play
“The Community Game” cooperated, while only one-third of the group that was told they were
going to play “The Wall Street” game cooperated. See Blair & Stout, supra note 54, at 1770-71.
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experience suggests that a “silo mentality” inhibits feelings of group identity and
trust and can be an overwhelming factor in the demise of corporate culture.104
Moreover, the Dodd-Frank whistleblower provisions erode trust by
discouraging collaboration and teamwork within an organization. The social
dilemma experiments reveal that players are more prone to cooperate and trust
one another in situations in which they anticipate the other players will cooperate
as well.105 As such, the reporting mechanisms under Dodd-Frank lead to a lack of
cooperation and trust within an organization because individuals within the
organization are less likely to expect that other individuals will cooperate—that is,
make use of internal reporting mechanisms. Rather, individuals within the
organization will naturally expect—and, in fact, Dodd-Frank encourages106—
employees to run directly to the SEC rather than internally report. This lack of
collaboration and teamwork to solve internal dilemmas is bound to pervade all
levels of the corporation. Management will expect a lack of cooperation among
lower-level employees, lower-level employees will expect a lack of support from
management, and employees will be less apt to turn to other employees for fear
of giving them keys to a bounty. By extension, Dodd-Frank converts employees
into perceived threats rather than corporate assets and converts management into
unsupportive , tight-lipped actors,. This compromises employee relations and
chills the level of trust within the organization.

B.

Erosions of Corporate Cultures of Compliance

Dodd-Frank erodes corporate cultures of compliance by luring employees
to directly bypass their company’s internal compliance programs, and as a result,
displaces long-standing federal policy prescriptions for effective and reliable
internal reporting systems mandated by the Sentencing Guidelines and SarbanesOxley.107 Moreover, “most responsible public companies have spent a significant
amount of time and money implementing,” promoting, and refining robust
compliance programs that continue to serve as valuable resources for companies,
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management, and employees.108
“While the [Dodd-Frank rules] include
provisions ‘intended not to discourage’ whistleblowers at companies with robust
compliance programs to first report . . . internally, they do not adequately encourage
employees to do so.”109 Because the “whistleblower program . . . does not
account for and fully maintain the vitality of corporate integrity programs”110
already established in response to federal regulations—and which have proven
effective in ensuring compliance with the law—existing corporate cultures of
compliance within organizations “will no longer [adequately] serve the purposes
for which they were specifically designed.”111
Moreover, the Dodd-Frank whistleblower provisions erode corporate
cultures of compliance by undermining internal abilities to develop and maintain
strategic visions of functional corporate compliance programs.112 The lack of
meaningful support sends an overriding message to employees that internal
reporting mechanisms as a whole are inadequate.113 To the extent that the
company’s internal reporting procedures require a company to report misconduct,
“the company’s internal processes [are] rendered meaningless if the employee”
can acquire information and disclose it to the SEC without consequence from the
company.114 Also, effective compliance programs rely primarily on internal
reporting to identify instances of misconduct, to investigate the facts, and to take
remedial actions.115 However, the likelihood to receive internal reports of
misconduct is significantly diminished under the current law, ultimately
weakening the compliance program that is already in place.116 Because effective
Letter from Neila B. Radin to Elizabeth Murphy, Secretary of U.S. Securities Exchange
Commission (Dec. 17. 2010), at 2, available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-3310/s73310.shtml [hereinafter Radin Letter].
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corporate cultures of compliance naturally comprise functioning internal
compliance programs—and because these compliance programs are weakened—
the overall effect will be a deterioration of corporate cultures of compliance.117
Additionally, the Dodd-Frank whistleblower provisions erode corporate
cultures of compliance because compliance mechanisms dwindle over time when
they lack enduring institutional support.118 The pronouncement by the SEC that
compliance is a consideration when determining the amount of the bounty to be
awarded is “thin on the ground” without the direct empowerment of internal
policies and corporate cultures of compliance.119 As such, even organizations that
embrace the requisite “tone at the top” to foster a corporate culture of
compliance lack the backing needed to pervade the entire organization.120 Absent
the alignment of the law with current internal policies and procedures, the
benefits stemming from these aspects of internal affairs—such as promoting a
culture of compliance—will be diminished, if not eradicated.121
Further, while some reports have indicated that the development of
internal compliance programs is on the rise post Dodd-Frank,122 increased
internal policing is not synonymous with a strong corporate culture of
compliance. Effective corporate cultures of compliance also contemplate
employee buy-in to internal compliance efforts;123 however, the provisions
ultimately remove the potential for this buy-in with superior monetary incentives
and anti-retaliation protections for external reporting. Therefore, no matter how
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much corporations attempt to vamp up their compliance efforts, these efforts
alone are not enough to prevent erosions of corporate cultures of compliance.
Lastly, Dodd-Frank erodes corporate cultures of compliance by
encouraging a “mercenary mentality” among employees and diminishing the
legitimate employer expectations of their employees to develop, maintain, and
advance corporate cultures of compliance.124 Monetarily, the provisions
encourage employees to withhold information from an employer when early
company involvement and remediation efforts could either mitigate or reduce the
resulting bounty.125 Traditionally, corporations have relied upon employees as a
group to police the conduct within the corporation and safeguard the reputation
of a company.126 Correspondingly, in the past, employees who chose to report
internally generally did so out of feelings of loyalty, group belonging, and an
overwhelming desire to help the company “root out corruption.”127 Now, the
encouraged “mercenary mentality” will prompt employees to race to the SEC at
the first sign of a violation rather than advance efforts to protect the reputation
and well-being of the corporation, resulting in the erosion of a culture of
compliance.128
VI. PROPOSAL
While Dodd-Frank alleges that the whistleblower bounty provisions are
not intended to discourage whistleblowers from first reporting misconduct
internally to companies that have robust compliance programs, the practical effect
of such provisions is, in fact, to diminish all internal reporting mechanisms
relating to violations of securities laws and to undermine corporate cultures of
trust and compliance. Therefore, in the event of an SEC enforcement action
resulting from an external whistleblower tip in which the information was not
first reported internally, Dodd-Frank should be amended to permit corporations
to establish an affirmative defense for possessing an effective, well-maintained
124
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corporate culture of trust and compliance. Moreover, if the corporation is able to
successfully establish the affirmative defense, the sanctions and monetary
penalties imposed on the corporation will be reduced, and more significantly,
there will be an absolute bar to the recovery of an award by a whistleblower under
the bounty program.
More specifically, using a preponderance of the evidence standard—in
which a corporate culture of trust and compliance is more likely to exist than
not—the judge will be required to engage in a full examination of all facts and
circumstances tending to prove the existence of a corporate culture of trust and
compliance. However, in taking into account all facts and circumstances, the
judge will be permitted to consider any information tending to show that internal
whistleblowing was impractical under the circumstances. Moreover, factors
tending to indicate a corporate culture of trust and compliance may include, but
are not limited to:
1.

A clearly defined code of ethics, accompanied with evidence tending to
show a strong commitment to upholding these policies and
procedures.129

2.

Apparent communication channels—such as reporting structures—and
open-door policies.130

3.

Employee feedback or overall company survey results tending to
indicate that teamwork, collaboration, and unity are valued as a means
to achieve company goals.131

4.

A compliance program that complies with the Sentencing Guidelines
and Sarbanes-Oxley of 2002 and is applicable to all members of the
organization.132

5.

A permeating value from top to bottom that encourages compliance
with the law and specific instances of visible dedication and support by
senior management.133
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6.

Active encouragement and solicitation of employees through e-mail
communications, placement of flyers, and posters to report potential
violations to the company.134

7.

Specific examples of communications to employees specifying that
those who report violations internally will not face retaliation, and
feedback from employees who reported information internally but did
not face retaliation.135

8.

Reward structures, either monetary or non-monetary for employees
who significantly contribute to the values of trust and compliance.

9.

Records of effective and timely investigative follow-up and responses
to reported and actual violations.136

Admittedly, because the proposal does not mandate internal reporting in
an absolute sense, critics will argue that the proposed solution “does not go far
enough” to support internal reporting efforts. However, this proposed solution
promises an advantageous middle ground that entertains the goals and wishes of
parties on each side of the whistleblower bounty provision debate. On one hand,
this solution creates a positive disincentive for employees to bypass effective
internal reporting procedures. Specifically, if an effective corporate culture of
trust and compliance is in place, then employees will be required to make use of
their internal reporting procedures prior to reporting to the SEC, or forego their
prospect of a bounty. With this in mind, employees have no incentive to
withhold information in attempt to allow increased sanctions, as doing so will not
provide them with a direct monetary benefit. Furthermore, by allowing those
entities that do embrace effective cultures to come forward with evidence
demonstrating this type of corporate environment, there is no opportunity for the
failure of some companies to undermine the others that have successfully
implemented the requisite culture.
Conversely, critics will also argue that this proposal instead goes too far,
creating too many obstacles for external whistleblower reporting. Unlike
mandatory internal reporting, as urged by the corporate community, there is no
mechanical assumption that the employer has an effective culture in place when
See generally Memorandum from Huntsman Corporation to Elizabeth Murphy, Secretary of U.S.
Securities Exchange Commission (Feb. 1, 2011), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s733-10/s73310.shtml .
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the burden of proof is placed on the employer to establish an effective corporate
culture of trust and compliance,. Therefore, this satisfies the concerns of those
individuals who vehemently oppose mandatory internal reporting—namely due to
the fact that while some employers maintain robust compliance processes and
cultures, others lack such established procedures and protections within their
culture. Additionally, by allowing employers the opportunity to present such
evidence, employers have a further incentive to make vigorous efforts to develop
effective cultures of trust and compliance.
Of course, critics will argue that this proposal promotes uncertainty
among employees, as employee whistleblowers will need to make their own initial
assessment of the effectiveness of the culture prior to deciding whether or not
they are required to report internally. However, the factors outlined under the
proposed changes will provide employees with objective criteria with which to
measure their corporate cultures of trust and compliance against. For the few
corporations in which the culture could sway in either direction, the practical
effect of the law is that employees will err on the side of caution and first report
the misconduct internally. For the reasons mentioned in this paper, it seems the
resulting increase in internal reporting would ultimately produce more benefits
than harm.
Furthermore, critics may also argue that this proposal will lead
corporations to resort to a “check the box” mentality. Specifically, they may
argue that corporations will deem the task of developing an effective corporate
culture of trust and compliance complete merely by “checking the box” under the
list of proposed factors, when in fact the true intent of the law contemplates a
continuous commitment. However, the factors listed in the proposal account for
this risk and specifically demand regular and continuous measures for
implementing the requisite culture. Additionally, the proposal maintains that the
factors indicative of an effective corporate culture of trust and compliance are
merely inclusive rather than exclusive. As such, the judge will be in a position to
take into account the presence of a “check the box” mentality when determining
whether or not an effective corporate culture of trust and compliance exists.
Lastly, critics will argue that this proposal leads to a system of
considerable judicial discretion. However, history has demonstrated that judges
are rational and logical actors who can competently apply the law to the facts to
reach an appropriate decision.137 Moreover, although the judge is not an insider
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of the organization, the judge is in the best position to serve as a neutral party
between the potentially competing views of the employer and employee.
VI. CONCLUSION
The whistleblower provisions of Dodd-Frank create unduly powerful
incentives for employees to bypass internal reporting mechanisms for violations
of securities laws, generating a host of perverse effects. An affirmative defense
for corporations with effective cultures of trust and compliance will help to
alleviate the concerns Dodd-Frank underscores by reinforcing the ability for
organizations to develop, implement, and maintain strong corporate cultures and
empowering those that do.

